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    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      Prepare version 1.13.12 · df9dabe5
      Simon McVittie authored 
      

Signed-off-by: default avatarSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
      df9dabe5
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      test: Add basic test coverage for DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 · 6231e7d7
      Simon McVittie authored 
      

We don't actually complete successful authentication, because that
would require us to generate a cookie and compute the correct SHA1,
which is difficult to do in a deterministic authentication script.
However, we do assert that dbus#269 (CVE-2019-12749) has been fixed.

Signed-off-by: default avatarSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
      6231e7d7
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      auth: Reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 for users other than the server owner · 2a11ab9b
      Simon McVittie authored 
      

The DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication mechanism aims to prove ownership
of a shared home directory by having the server write a secret "cookie"
into a .dbus-keyrings subdirectory of the desired identity's home
directory with 0700 permissions, and having the client prove that it can
read the cookie. This never actually worked for non-malicious clients in
the case where server uid != client uid (unless the server and client
both have privileges, such as Linux CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or traditional
Unix uid 0) because an unprivileged server would fail to write out the
cookie, and an unprivileged client would be unable to read the resulting
file owned by the server.

Additionally, since dbus 1.7.10 we have checked that ~/.dbus-keyrings
is owned by the uid of the server (a side-effect of a check added to
harden our use of XDG_RUNTIME_DIR), further ruling out successful use
by a non-malicious client with a uid differing from the server's.

Joe Vennix of Apple Information Security discovered that the
implementation of DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 was susceptible to a symbolic link
attack: a malicious client with write access to its own home directory
could manipulate a ~/.dbus-keyrings symlink to cause the DBusServer to
read and write in unintended locations. In the worst case this could
result in the DBusServer reusing a cookie that is known to the
malicious client, and treating that cookie as evidence that a subsequent
client connection came from an attacker-chosen uid, allowing
authentication bypass.

This is mitigated by the fact that by default, the well-known system
dbus-daemon (since 2003) and the well-known session dbus-daemon (in
stable releases since dbus 1.10.0 in 2015) only accept the EXTERNAL
authentication mechanism, and as a result will reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1
at an early stage, before manipulating cookies. As a result, this
vulnerability only applies to:

* system or session dbus-daemons with non-standard configuration
* third-party dbus-daemon invocations such as at-spi2-core (although
  in practice at-spi2-core also only accepts EXTERNAL by default)
* third-party uses of DBusServer such as the one in Upstart

Avoiding symlink attacks in a portable way is difficult, because APIs
like openat() and Linux /proc/self/fd are not universally available.
However, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 already doesn't work in practice for
a non-matching uid, we can solve this vulnerability in an easier way
without regressions, by rejecting it early (before looking at
~/.dbus-keyrings) whenever the requested identity doesn't match the
identity of the process hosting the DBusServer.

Signed-off-by: default avatarSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Closes: dbus/dbus#269
Closes: CVE-2019-12749
      2a11ab9b
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      Revert "Start spec 0.36 development" · 00099d5d
      Simon McVittie authored 
      This reverts commit edece027.
No spec changes have happened since 0.35.
      00099d5d
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