1. 30 Nov, 2018 1 commit
  2. 29 Nov, 2018 1 commit
  3. 06 Nov, 2018 5 commits
  4. 25 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  5. 12 Sep, 2018 3 commits
  6. 23 Aug, 2018 4 commits
  7. 16 Aug, 2018 1 commit
  8. 15 Aug, 2018 1 commit
    • Jan Rybar's avatar
      Leaking zombie child processes · 8638ec5c
      Jan Rybar authored
      Resolves: bz#106021
      Subject: [PATCH] polkitd: fix zombie not reaped when js spawned process timed
      The child watch source attached to thread context didn't work due
      to the release of it's main loop and context outside. So we attach
      the source to the global default main context to make it work and
      avoid zombies.
  9. 09 Aug, 2018 1 commit
  10. 10 Jul, 2018 1 commit
  11. 03 Jul, 2018 2 commits
    • Miloslav Trmač's avatar
      Update NEWS for release · b0a5d0f1
      Miloslav Trmač authored
    • Miloslav Trmač's avatar
      Fix CVE-2018-1116: Trusting client-supplied UID · bc7ffad5
      Miloslav Trmač authored
      As part of CVE-2013-4288, the D-Bus clients were allowed (and
      encouraged) to submit the UID of the subject of authorization checks
      to avoid races against UID changes (notably using executables
      set-UID to root).
      However, that also allowed any client to submit an arbitrary UID, and
      that could be used to bypass "can only ask about / affect the same UID"
      checks in CheckAuthorization / RegisterAuthenticationAgent /
      UnregisterAuthenticationAgent.  This allowed an attacker:
      - With CheckAuthorization, to cause the registered authentication
        agent in victim's session to pop up a dialog, or to determine whether
        the victim currently has a temporary authorization to perform an
        (In principle, the attacker can also determine whether JavaScript
        rules allow the victim process to perform an operation; however,
        usually rules base their decisions on information determined from
        the supplied UID, so the attacker usually won't learn anything new.)
      - With RegisterAuthenticationAgent, to prevent the victim's
        authentication agent to work (for a specific victim process),
        or to learn about which operations requiring authorization
        the victim is attempting.
      To fix this, expose internal _polkit_unix_process_get_owner() /
      obsolete polkit_unix_process_get_owner() as a private
      polkit_unix_process_get_racy_uid__() (being more explicit about the
      dangers on relying on it), and use it in
      polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject() to return
      a boolean indicating whether the subject UID may be caller-chosen.
      Then, in the permission checks that require the subject to be
      equal to the caller, fail on caller-chosen UIDs (and continue
      through the pre-existing code paths which allow root, or root-designated
      server processes, to ask about arbitrary subjects.)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMiloslav Trmač <mitr@redhat.com>
  12. 03 Apr, 2018 19 commits