- 20 Nov, 2022 1 commit
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Makes macro expansion safer and eliminates -Wextra-semi-stmt warnings from clang every time it is called due to semicolon after bracket. Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 29 Oct, 2022 1 commit
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 17 Oct, 2022 2 commits
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Oracle no longer includes this term in our copyright & license notices. Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 17 Jul, 2022 1 commit
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Fixes: #4 Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 11 Jun, 2022 2 commits
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Originally from OpenBSD, based on libx11@bcf7b5aa Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 10 Jun, 2022 8 commits
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
These also haven't been needed since C89 Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
These aren't needed in C89 and later, but can hide missing prototypes that generate broken code on platforms where pointers are larger than ints. Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Clears gcc warning: Xge.c:302:11: warning: no previous prototype for ‘xgeExtRegister’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] _X_HIDDEN xgeExtRegister(Display* dpy, int offset, XExtensionHooks* callbacks) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Found by using: codespell --builtin clear,rare,usage,informal,code,names Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 03 Aug, 2019 1 commit
-
-
Signed-off-by:
Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> Reviewed-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 16 Mar, 2019 3 commits
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 20 Nov, 2018 1 commit
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 26 Jan, 2017 3 commits
-
-
Signed-off-by:
Mihail Konev <k.mvc@ya.ru>
-
Place quotes around the $srcdir, $ORIGDIR and $0 variables to prevent fall-outs, when they contain space. Signed-off-by:
Emil Velikov <emil.l.velikov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Signed-off-by:
Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-
Peter Hutterer authored
Syncs the invocation of configure with the one from the server. Signed-off-by:
Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Reviewed-by:
Emil Velikov <emil.velikov@collabora.com>
-
- 04 Mar, 2016 4 commits
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
If the compiler knows of a better algorithm for counting the number of bits set in a word for the target CPU, let it use that, instead of the classic algorithm optimized for PDP-6. Tested for the range of values used in XSecurity.c and verified results are the same from both: for (unsigned long i = 0; i <= XSecurityAllAuthorizationAttributes; i++) { printf("ones: %d\tpopcnt: %d\n", Ones(i), __builtin_popcountl(i)); } Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Catch if anyone ever defines more types again and forgets to increase the size of the value buffer to match. v2: assert on the full set of possible values, regardless of which the current caller passed in this call - more likely to be spotted during testing, less likely to not be found until called in production. Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=94292 Reviewed-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 23 Jul, 2014 1 commit
-
-
Peter Hutterer authored
Signed-off-by:
Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-
- 17 Mar, 2014 1 commit
-
-
Keith Packard authored
When mixing Xlib and xcb, it's quite possible for some events to be received for xcb-only extensions, which will subsequently not be translatable by the Xge WireToEvent/EventToWire hooks Signed-off-by:
Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com> Reviewed-by:
Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
-
- 09 Mar, 2014 1 commit
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
evi_return is passed in as a pointer to a location into which XeviGetVisualInfo is expected to write a pointer to the memory it allocated for the returned structures. If we're failing and bailing out, we need to dispose of the pointer we set, not the one passed into us (which the caller may have put on the stack or allocated as part of a larger structure). Flagged by cppcheck 1.64: [lib/libXext/src/XEVI.c:182] -> [lib/libXext/src/XEVI.c:186]: (warning) Possible null pointer dereference: evi_return - otherwise it is redundant to check it against null. Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 19 Jan, 2014 1 commit
-
-
A malicious X server claiming to not support GE but sending a GE would SEGV the client (always a NULL derefrence). Possible since d1c93500 . (Also guard the EventToWire case so it's harder to shoot yourself in the foot.) Signed-off-by:
Nathan Kidd <nkidd@opentext.com> Reviewed-by:
Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Signed-off-by:
Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-
- 08 Nov, 2013 1 commit
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
_XEatDataWords was orignally introduced with the May 2013 security patches, and in order to ease the process of delivering those, fallback versions of _XEatDataWords were included in the X extension library patches so they could be applied to older versions that didn't have libX11 1.6 yet. Now that we're past that hurdle, we can drop the fallbacks and just require libX11 1.6 for building new versions of the extension libraries. Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 25 Jun, 2013 1 commit
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 22 Jun, 2013 1 commit
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 31 May, 2013 1 commit
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 03 May, 2013 2 commits
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
If the number of counters or amount of data reported by the server is large enough that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are read from the X server than the size of the buffers we allocated to hold them. V2: Make sure we don't walk past the end of the reply when converting data from wire format to the structures returned to the caller. Reported-by:
Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
If the number of rectangles reported by the server is large enough that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are read from the X server than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them. Reported-by:
Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
- 27 Apr, 2013 3 commits
-
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
If the number of visuals or conflicts reported by the server is large enough that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are read from the X server than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them. Reported-by:
Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
If the number of screens or visuals reported by the server is large enough that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are read from the X server than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them. Reported-by:
Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-
Alan Coopersmith authored
If the computed number of entries is large enough that it overflows when multiplied by the size of a xColorItem struct, or is treated as negative when compared to the size of the stack allocated buffer, then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are read from the X server than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them. The requirement to match the number of colors specified by the caller makes this much harder to hit than the one in XcupGetReservedColormapEntries() Reported-by:
Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by:
Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-