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  1. 23 Feb, 2019 7 commits
  3. 17 Feb, 2019 1 commit
  5. 16 Jan, 2019 2 commits
  7. 01 Jan, 2019 3 commits
    • Alan Coopersmith's avatar
      Avoid use-after-free in _XimProtoSetIMValues() · 003e30a6
      Alan Coopersmith authored 
      Fixes gitlab issue #49Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith's avatarAlan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
      003e30a6
    • Alan Coopersmith's avatar
      Fix implicit conversion warnings in _XlcCreateDefaultCharSet · 30656fd6
      Alan Coopersmith authored 
      lcCharSet.c:187:50: warning: implicit conversion changes signedness:
      'int' to 'unsigned long' [-Wsign-conversion]
    tmp = Xmalloc(name_len + 1 + ct_sequence_len + 1);
          ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~
../../include/X11/Xlibint.h:453:32: note: expanded from macro 'Xmalloc'
                       ~~~~~~  ^~~~
lcCharSet.c:192:31: warning: implicit conversion changes signedness:
      'int' to 'unsigned long' [-Wsign-conversion]
    memcpy(tmp, name, name_len+1);
    ~~~~~~            ~~~~~~~~^~
lcCharSet.c:216:45: warning: implicit conversion changes signedness:
      'int' to 'unsigned long' [-Wsign-conversion]
    memcpy(tmp, ct_sequence, ct_sequence_len+1);
    ~~~~~~                   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~
lcCharSet.c:183:16: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision:
      'unsigned long' to 'int' [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
    name_len = strlen(name);
             ~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~
lcCharSet.c:184:23: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision:
      'unsigned long' to 'int' [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
    ct_sequence_len = strlen(ct_sequence);
                    ~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
lcCharSet.c:198:37: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision:
     'long' to 'unsigned int' [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
        unsigned int length = colon - charset->name;
                     ~~~~~~   ~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith's avatarAlan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
      30656fd6
    • Alan Coopersmith's avatar
      Remove no-longer-used name variable in _XGetAtomName · 2e630090
      Alan Coopersmith authored 
      Fixes gcc warning:
GetAtomNm.c: In function ‘_XGetAtomName’:
GetAtomNm.c:39:11: warning: unused variable ‘name’ [-Wunused-variable]
     char *name;
           ^~~~

Introduced by commit 336c1e7aSigned-off-by: Alan Coopersmith's avatarAlan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
      2e630090
  9. 29 Dec, 2018 1 commit
  11. 08 Dec, 2018 8 commits
  13. 20 Nov, 2018 1 commit
  15. 12 Nov, 2018 2 commits
  17. 10 Nov, 2018 1 commit
  19. 09 Oct, 2018 1 commit
  21. 28 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  23. 25 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  25. 22 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  27. 21 Aug, 2018 5 commits
    • Matthieu Herrb's avatar
      libX11 1.6.6 · 733f64bf
      Matthieu Herrb authored 
      Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb's avatarMatthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
      733f64bf
    • Matthieu Herrb's avatar
      Remove statement with no effect. · 17370424
      Matthieu Herrb authored 
      Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb's avatarMatthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
      17370424
    • Tobias Stoeckmann's avatar
      Fixed crash on invalid reply (CVE-2018-14598). · e8372276
      Tobias Stoeckmann authored 
      If the server sends a reply in which even the first string would
overflow the transmitted bytes, list[0] (or flist[0]) will be set to
NULL and a count of 0 is returned.

If the resulting list is freed with XFreeExtensionList or
XFreeFontPath later on, the first Xfree call:

    Xfree (list[0]-1)
 turns into
    Xfree (NULL-1)

which will most likely trigger a segmentation fault.

I have modified the code to return NULL if the first string would
overflow, thus protecting the freeing functions later on.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann's avatarTobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
      e8372276
    • Tobias Stoeckmann's avatar
      Fixed out of boundary write (CVE-2018-14600). · dbf72805
      Tobias Stoeckmann authored 
      The length value is interpreted as signed char on many systems
(depending on default signedness of char), which can lead to an out of
boundary write up to 128 bytes in front of the allocated storage, but
limited to NUL byte(s).

Casting the length value to unsigned char fixes the problem and allows
string values with up to 255 characters.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann's avatarTobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
      dbf72805
    • Tobias Stoeckmann's avatar
      Fixed off-by-one writes (CVE-2018-14599). · b469da14
      Tobias Stoeckmann authored 
      The functions XGetFontPath, XListExtensions, and XListFonts are
vulnerable to an off-by-one override on malicious server responses.

The server replies consist of chunks consisting of a length byte
followed by actual string, which is not NUL-terminated.

While parsing the response, the length byte is overridden with '\0',
thus the memory area can be used as storage of C strings later on. To
be able to NUL-terminate the last string, the buffer is reserved with
an additional byte of space.

For a boundary check, the variable chend (end of ch) was introduced,
pointing at the end of the buffer which ch initially points to.
Unfortunately there is a difference in handling "the end of ch".

While chend points at the first byte that must not be written to,
the for-loop uses chend as the last byte that can be written to.

Therefore, an off-by-one can occur.

I have refactored the code so chend actually points to the last byte
that can be written to without an out of boundary access. As it is not
possible to achieve "ch + length < chend" and "ch + length + 1 > chend"
with the corrected chend meaning, I removed the inner if-check.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann's avatarTobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
      b469da14
  29. 17 Jul, 2018 1 commit
  31. 13 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  33. 14 May, 2018 1 commit
  35. 05 May, 2018 1 commit
  37. 30 Mar, 2018 1 commit