1. 08 Dec, 2018 8 commits
  2. 20 Nov, 2018 1 commit
  3. 12 Nov, 2018 2 commits
  4. 10 Nov, 2018 1 commit
  5. 09 Oct, 2018 1 commit
  6. 28 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  7. 25 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  8. 22 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  9. 21 Aug, 2018 5 commits
    • Matthieu Herrb's avatar
      libX11 1.6.6 · 733f64bf
      Matthieu Herrb authored
      Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb's avatarMatthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
    • Matthieu Herrb's avatar
      Remove statement with no effect. · 17370424
      Matthieu Herrb authored
      Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb's avatarMatthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
    • Tobias Stoeckmann's avatar
      Fixed crash on invalid reply (CVE-2018-14598). · e8372276
      Tobias Stoeckmann authored
      If the server sends a reply in which even the first string would
      overflow the transmitted bytes, list[0] (or flist[0]) will be set to
      NULL and a count of 0 is returned.
      If the resulting list is freed with XFreeExtensionList or
      XFreeFontPath later on, the first Xfree call:
          Xfree (list[0]-1)
       turns into
          Xfree (NULL-1)
      which will most likely trigger a segmentation fault.
      I have modified the code to return NULL if the first string would
      overflow, thus protecting the freeing functions later on.
      Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann's avatarTobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
    • Tobias Stoeckmann's avatar
      Fixed out of boundary write (CVE-2018-14600). · dbf72805
      Tobias Stoeckmann authored
      The length value is interpreted as signed char on many systems
      (depending on default signedness of char), which can lead to an out of
      boundary write up to 128 bytes in front of the allocated storage, but
      limited to NUL byte(s).
      Casting the length value to unsigned char fixes the problem and allows
      string values with up to 255 characters.
      Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann's avatarTobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
    • Tobias Stoeckmann's avatar
      Fixed off-by-one writes (CVE-2018-14599). · b469da14
      Tobias Stoeckmann authored
      The functions XGetFontPath, XListExtensions, and XListFonts are
      vulnerable to an off-by-one override on malicious server responses.
      The server replies consist of chunks consisting of a length byte
      followed by actual string, which is not NUL-terminated.
      While parsing the response, the length byte is overridden with '\0',
      thus the memory area can be used as storage of C strings later on. To
      be able to NUL-terminate the last string, the buffer is reserved with
      an additional byte of space.
      For a boundary check, the variable chend (end of ch) was introduced,
      pointing at the end of the buffer which ch initially points to.
      Unfortunately there is a difference in handling "the end of ch".
      While chend points at the first byte that must not be written to,
      the for-loop uses chend as the last byte that can be written to.
      Therefore, an off-by-one can occur.
      I have refactored the code so chend actually points to the last byte
      that can be written to without an out of boundary access. As it is not
      possible to achieve "ch + length < chend" and "ch + length + 1 > chend"
      with the corrected chend meaning, I removed the inner if-check.
      Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann's avatarTobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
  10. 17 Jul, 2018 1 commit
  11. 13 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  12. 14 May, 2018 1 commit
  13. 05 May, 2018 1 commit
  14. 30 Mar, 2018 1 commit
  15. 24 Mar, 2018 1 commit
  16. 23 Mar, 2018 1 commit
    • Michal Srb's avatar
      Use flexible array member instead of fake size. · a9dafdd5
      Michal Srb authored
      The _XimCacheStruct structure is followed in memory by two strings containing
      fname and encoding. The memory was accessed using the last member of the
      structure `char fname[1]`. That is a lie, prohibits us from using sizeof and
      confuses checkers. Lets declare it properly as a flexible array, so compilers
      don't complain about writing past that array. As bonus we can replace the
      XOffsetOf with regular sizeof.
      Fixes GCC8 error:
        In function 'strcpy',
            inlined from '_XimWriteCachedDefaultTree' at imLcIm.c:479:5,
            inlined from '_XimCreateDefaultTree' at imLcIm.c:616:2,
            inlined from '_XimLocalOpenIM' at imLcIm.c:700:5:
        /usr/include/bits/string_fortified.h:90:10: error: '__builtin_strcpy'
        forming offset 2 is out of the bounds [0, 1] [-Werror=array-bounds]
           return __builtin___strcpy_chk (__dest, __src, __bos (__dest));
      Caused by this line seemingly writing past the fname[1] array:
        imLcIm.c:479:  strcpy (m->fname+strlen(name)+1, encoding);
      Reviewed-by: Keith Packard's avatarKeith Packard <keithp@keithp.com>
      Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer's avatarPeter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
  17. 07 Mar, 2018 1 commit
  18. 03 Sep, 2017 1 commit
  19. 20 Aug, 2017 5 commits
  20. 14 Aug, 2017 5 commits