Commit 78dc53c4 authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'for-linus2' of git://

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "In this patchset, we finally get an SELinux update, with Paul Moore
  taking over as maintainer of that code.

  Also a significant update for the Keys subsystem, as well as
  maintenance updates to Smack, IMA, TPM, and Apparmor"

and since I wanted to know more about the updates to key handling,
here's the explanation from David Howells on that:

 "Okay.  There are a number of separate bits.  I'll go over the big bits
  and the odd important other bit, most of the smaller bits are just
  fixes and cleanups.  If you want the small bits accounting for, I can
  do that too.

   (1) Keyring capacity expansion.

        KEYS: Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for key access
        KEYS: Introduce a search context structure
        KEYS: Search for auth-key by name rather than target key ID
        Add a generic associative array implementation.
        KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring

     Several of the patches are providing an expansion of the capacity of a
     keyring.  Currently, the maximum size of a keyring payload is one page.
     Subtract a small header and then divide up into pointers, that only gives
     you ~500 pointers on an x86_64 box.  However, since the NFS idmapper uses
     a keyring to store ID mapping data, that has proven to be insufficient to
     the cause.

     Whatever data structure I use to handle the keyring payload, it can only
     store pointers to keys, not the keys themselves because several keyrings
     may point to a single key.  This precludes inserting, say, and rb_node
     struct into the key struct for this purpose.

     I could make an rbtree of records such that each record has an rb_node
     and a key pointer, but that would use four words of space per key stored
     in the keyring.  It would, however, be able to use much existing code.

     I selected instead a non-rebalancing radix-tree type approach as that
     could have a better space-used/key-pointer ratio.  I could have used the
     radix tree implementation that we already have and insert keys into it by
     their serial numbers, but that means any sort of search must iterate over
     the whole radix tree.  Further, its nodes are a bit on the capacious side
     for what I want - especially given that key serial numbers are randomly
     allocated, thus leaving a lot of empty space in the tree.

     So what I have is an associative array that internally is a radix-tree
     with 16 pointers per node where the index key is constructed from the key
     type pointer and the key description.  This means that an exact lookup by
     type+description is very fast as this tells us how to navigate directly to
     the target key.

     I made the data structure general in lib/assoc_array.c as far as it is
     concerned, its index key is just a sequence of bits that leads to a
     pointer.  It's possible that someone else will be able to make use of it
     also.  FS-Cache might, for example.

   (2) Mark keys as 'trusted' and keyrings as 'trusted only'.

        KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key
        KEYS: Make the system 'trusted' keyring viewable by userspace
        KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
        KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing

     These patches allow keys carrying asymmetric public keys to be marked as
     being 'trusted' and allow keyrings to be marked as only permitting the
     addition or linkage of trusted keys.

     Keys loaded from hardware during kernel boot or compiled into the kernel
     during build are marked as being trusted automatically.  New keys can be
     loaded at runtime with add_key().  They are checked against the system
     keyring contents and if their signatures can be validated with keys that
     are already marked trusted, then they are marked trusted also and can
     thus be added into the master keyring.

     Patches from Mimi Zohar make this usable with the IMA keyrings also.

   (3) Remove the date checks on the key used to validate a module signature.

        X.509: Remove certificate date checks

     It's not reasonable to reject a signature just because the key that it was
     generated with is no longer valid datewise - especially if the kernel
     hasn't yet managed to set the system clock when the first module is
     loaded - so just remove those checks.

   (4) Make it simpler to deal with additional X.509 being loaded into the kernel.

        KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring
        KEYS: Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certs better to deduplicate

     The builder of the kernel now just places files with the extension ".x509"
     into the kernel source or build trees and they're concatenated by the
     kernel build and stuffed into the appropriate section.

   (5) Add support for userspace kerberos to use keyrings.

        KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches
        KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfs

     Fedora went to, by default, storing kerberos tickets and tokens in tmpfs.
     We looked at storing it in keyrings instead as that confers certain
     advantages such as tickets being automatically deleted after a certain
     amount of time and the ability for the kernel to get at these tokens more

     To make this work, two things were needed:

     (a) A way for the tickets to persist beyond the lifetime of all a user's
         sessions so that cron-driven processes can still use them.

         The problem is that a user's session keyrings are deleted when the
         session that spawned them logs out and the user's user keyring is
         deleted when the UID is deleted (typically when the last log out
         happens), so neither of these places is suitable.

         I've added a system keyring into which a 'persistent' keyring is
         created for each UID on request.  Each time a user requests their
         persistent keyring, the expiry time on it is set anew.  If the user
         doesn't ask for it for, say, three days, the keyring is automatically
         expired and garbage collected using the existing gc.  All the kerberos
         tokens it held are then also gc'd.

     (b) A key type that can hold really big tickets (up to 1MB in size).

         The problem is that Active Directory can return huge tickets with lots
         of auxiliary data attached.  We don't, however, want to eat up huge
         tracts of unswappable kernel space for this, so if the ticket is
         greater than a certain size, we create a swappable shmem file and dump
         the contents in there and just live with the fact we then have an
         inode and a dentry overhead.  If the ticket is smaller than that, we
         slap it in a kmalloc()'d buffer"

* 'for-linus2' of git:// (121 commits)
  KEYS: Fix keyring content gc scanner
  KEYS: Fix error handling in big_key instantiation
  KEYS: Fix UID check in keyctl_get_persistent()
  KEYS: The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB
  ima: define '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
  ima: extend the measurement list to include the file signature
  kernel/system_certificate.S: use real contents instead of macro GLOBAL()
  KEYS: fix error return code in big_key_instantiate()
  KEYS: Fix keyring quota misaccounting on key replacement and unlink
  KEYS: Fix a race between negating a key and reading the error set
  KEYS: Make BIG_KEYS boolean
  apparmor: remove the "task" arg from may_change_ptraced_domain()
  apparmor: remove parent task info from audit logging
  apparmor: remove tsk field from the apparmor_audit_struct
  apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during reporting
  Smack: Ptrace access check mode
  ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr
  ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms
  ima: define kernel parameter 'ima_template=' to change configured default
  ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template
parents 3eaded86 62fe3182
This diff is collapsed.
......@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ adi,adt7461 +/-1C TDM Extended Temp Range I.C
adt7461 +/-1C TDM Extended Temp Range I.C
at,24c08 i2c serial eeprom (24cxx)
atmel,24c02 i2c serial eeprom (24cxx)
atmel,at97sc3204t i2c trusted platform module (TPM)
catalyst,24c32 i2c serial eeprom
dallas,ds1307 64 x 8, Serial, I2C Real-Time Clock
dallas,ds1338 I2C RTC with 56-Byte NV RAM
......@@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ mc,rv3029c2 Real Time Clock Module with I2C-Bus
national,lm75 I2C TEMP SENSOR
national,lm80 Serial Interface ACPI-Compatible Microprocessor System Hardware Monitor
national,lm92 ±0.33°C Accurate, 12-Bit + Sign Temperature Sensor and Thermal Window Comparator with Two-Wire Interface
nuvoton,npct501 i2c trusted platform module (TPM)
nxp,pca9556 Octal SMBus and I2C registered interface
nxp,pca9557 8-bit I2C-bus and SMBus I/O port with reset
nxp,pcf8563 Real-time clock/calendar
......@@ -61,3 +63,4 @@ taos,tsl2550 Ambient Light Sensor with SMBUS/Two Wire Serial Interface
ti,tsc2003 I2C Touch-Screen Controller
ti,tmp102 Low Power Digital Temperature Sensor with SMBUS/Two Wire Serial Interface
ti,tmp275 Digital Temperature Sensor
winbond,wpct301 i2c trusted platform module (TPM)
......@@ -1190,15 +1190,24 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
owned by uid=0.
ima_hash= [IMA]
Format: { "sha1" | "md5" }
Format: { md5 | sha1 | rmd160 | sha256 | sha384
| sha512 | ... }
default: "sha1"
The list of supported hash algorithms is defined
in crypto/hash_info.h.
ima_tcb [IMA]
Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
Computing Base. This means IMA will measure all
programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
opened for read by uid=0.
ima_template= [IMA]
Select one of defined IMA measurements template formats.
Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
Default: "ima-ng"
init= [KNL]
Format: <full_path>
Run specified binary instead of /sbin/init as init
......@@ -22,3 +22,5 @@ keys.txt
- description of the kernel key retention service.
- documentation on the TOMOYO Linux Security Module.
- documentation on the template management mechanism for IMA.
IMA Template Management Mechanism
The original 'ima' template is fixed length, containing the filedata hash
and pathname. The filedata hash is limited to 20 bytes (md5/sha1).
The pathname is a null terminated string, limited to 255 characters.
To overcome these limitations and to add additional file metadata, it is
necessary to extend the current version of IMA by defining additional
templates. For example, information that could be possibly reported are
the inode UID/GID or the LSM labels either of the inode and of the process
that is accessing it.
However, the main problem to introduce this feature is that, each time
a new template is defined, the functions that generate and display
the measurements list would include the code for handling a new format
and, thus, would significantly grow over the time.
The proposed solution solves this problem by separating the template
management from the remaining IMA code. The core of this solution is the
definition of two new data structures: a template descriptor, to determine
which information should be included in the measurement list; a template
field, to generate and display data of a given type.
Managing templates with these structures is very simple. To support
a new data type, developers define the field identifier and implement
two functions, init() and show(), respectively to generate and display
measurement entries. Defining a new template descriptor requires
specifying the template format, a string of field identifiers separated
by the '|' character. While in the current implementation it is possible
to define new template descriptors only by adding their definition in the
template specific code (ima_template.c), in a future version it will be
possible to register a new template on a running kernel by supplying to IMA
the desired format string. In this version, IMA initializes at boot time
all defined template descriptors by translating the format into an array
of template fields structures taken from the set of the supported ones.
After the initialization step, IMA will call ima_alloc_init_template()
(new function defined within the patches for the new template management
mechanism) to generate a new measurement entry by using the template
descriptor chosen through the kernel configuration or through the newly
introduced 'ima_template=' kernel command line parameter. It is during this
phase that the advantages of the new architecture are clearly shown:
the latter function will not contain specific code to handle a given template
but, instead, it simply calls the init() method of the template fields
associated to the chosen template descriptor and store the result (pointer
to allocated data and data length) in the measurement entry structure.
The same mechanism is employed to display measurements entries.
The functions ima[_ascii]_measurements_show() retrieve, for each entry,
the template descriptor used to produce that entry and call the show()
method for each item of the array of template fields structures.
In the following, there is the list of supported template fields
('<identifier>': description), that can be used to define new template
descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string
(support for more data types will be added later):
- 'd': the digest of the event (i.e. the digest of a measured file),
calculated with the SHA1 or MD5 hash algorithm;
- 'n': the name of the event (i.e. the file name), with size up to 255 bytes;
- 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
- 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations.
Below, there is the list of defined template descriptors:
- "ima": its format is 'd|n';
- "ima-ng" (default): its format is 'd-ng|n-ng'.
==== USE ====
To specify the template descriptor to be used to generate measurement entries,
currently the following methods are supported:
- select a template descriptor among those supported in the kernel
configuration ('ima-ng' is the default choice);
- specify a template descriptor name from the kernel command line through
the 'ima_template=' parameter.
......@@ -865,15 +865,14 @@ encountered:
calling processes has a searchable link to the key from one of its
keyrings. There are three functions for dealing with these:
key_ref_t make_key_ref(const struct key *key,
unsigned long possession);
key_ref_t make_key_ref(const struct key *key, bool possession);
struct key *key_ref_to_ptr(const key_ref_t key_ref);
unsigned long is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref);
bool is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref);
The first function constructs a key reference from a key pointer and
possession information (which must be 0 or 1 and not any other value).
possession information (which must be true or false).
The second function retrieves the key pointer from a reference and the
third retrieves the possession flag.
......@@ -961,14 +960,17 @@ payload contents" for more information.
the argument will not be parsed.
(*) Extra references can be made to a key by calling the following function:
(*) Extra references can be made to a key by calling one of the following
struct key *__key_get(struct key *key);
struct key *key_get(struct key *key);
These need to be disposed of by calling key_put() when they've been
finished with. The key pointer passed in will be returned. If the pointer
is NULL or CONFIG_KEYS is not set then the key will not be dereferenced and
no increment will take place.
Keys so references will need to be disposed of by calling key_put() when
they've been finished with. The key pointer passed in will be returned.
In the case of key_get(), if the pointer is NULL or CONFIG_KEYS is not set
then the key will not be dereferenced and no increment will take place.
(*) A key's serial number can be obtained by calling:
......@@ -7515,9 +7515,10 @@ SELINUX SECURITY MODULE
M: Stephen Smalley <>
M: James Morris <>
M: Eric Paris <>
M: Paul Moore <>
L: (subscribers-only, general discussion)
T: git git://
T: git git://
S: Supported
F: include/linux/selinux*
F: security/selinux/
......@@ -8664,6 +8665,7 @@ F: drivers/media/usb/tm6000/
M: Leonidas Da Silva Barbosa <>
M: Ashley Lai <>
M: Peter Huewe <>
M: Rajiv Andrade <>
M: Marcel Selhorst <>
......@@ -1402,6 +1402,9 @@ config CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER
This option enables the user-spaces interface for symmetric
key cipher algorithms.
source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
source crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
......@@ -104,3 +104,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER) += algif_skcipher.o
obj-$(CONFIG_XOR_BLOCKS) += xor.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASYNC_CORE) += async_tx/
obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys/
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO) += hash_info.o
......@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ if ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
tristate "Asymmetric public-key crypto algorithm subtype"
select MPILIB
This option provides support for asymmetric public key type handling.
If signature generation and/or verification are to be used,
......@@ -20,8 +22,8 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
tristate "RSA public-key algorithm"
select MPILIB
This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447).
......@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
.match = asymmetric_key_match,
.destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy,
.describe = asymmetric_key_describe,
......@@ -22,29 +22,25 @@
const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
[PKEY_HASH_MD4] = "md4",
[PKEY_HASH_MD5] = "md5",
[PKEY_HASH_SHA1] = "sha1",
[PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160] = "rmd160",
[PKEY_HASH_SHA256] = "sha256",
[PKEY_HASH_SHA384] = "sha384",
[PKEY_HASH_SHA512] = "sha512",
[PKEY_HASH_SHA224] = "sha224",
const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \
[PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = &RSA_public_key_algorithm,
const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
[PKEY_ID_X509] = "X509",
* Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys.
......@@ -56,7 +52,7 @@ static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
if (key)
seq_printf(m, "%s.%s",
pkey_id_type[key->id_type], key->algo->name);
pkey_id_type_name[key->id_type], key->algo->name);
......@@ -78,21 +74,45 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_destroy);
* Verify a signature using a public key.
static int public_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key,
const struct public_key_signature *sig)
int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pk,
const struct public_key_signature *sig)
const struct public_key *pk = key->;
const struct public_key_algorithm *algo;
algo = pk->algo;
if (!algo) {
if (pk->pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST)
return -ENOPKG;
algo = pkey_algo[pk->pkey_algo];
if (!algo)
return -ENOPKG;
if (!pk->algo->verify_signature)
if (!algo->verify_signature)
return -ENOTSUPP;
if (sig->nr_mpi != pk->algo->n_sig_mpi) {
if (sig->nr_mpi != algo->n_sig_mpi) {
pr_debug("Signature has %u MPI not %u\n",
sig->nr_mpi, pk->algo->n_sig_mpi);
sig->nr_mpi, algo->n_sig_mpi);
return -EINVAL;
return pk->algo->verify_signature(pk, sig);
return algo->verify_signature(pk, sig);
static int public_key_verify_signature_2(const struct key *key,
const struct public_key_signature *sig)
const struct public_key *pk = key->;
return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig);
......@@ -103,6 +123,6 @@ struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype = {
.name = "public_key",
.describe = public_key_describe,
.destroy = public_key_destroy,
.verify_signature = public_key_verify_signature,
.verify_signature = public_key_verify_signature_2,
......@@ -28,3 +28,9 @@ struct public_key_algorithm {
extern const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm;
* public_key.c
extern int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pk,
const struct public_key_signature *sig);
......@@ -73,13 +73,13 @@ static const struct {
size_t size;
} RSA_ASN1_templates[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
#define _(X) { RSA_digest_info_##X, sizeof(RSA_digest_info_##X) }
[PKEY_HASH_MD5] = _(MD5),
[PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160] = _(RIPE_MD_160),
[PKEY_HASH_SHA256] = _(SHA256),
[PKEY_HASH_SHA384] = _(SHA384),
[PKEY_HASH_SHA512] = _(SHA512),
[PKEY_HASH_SHA224] = _(SHA224),
[HASH_ALGO_MD5] = _(MD5),
[HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_160] = _(RIPE_MD_160),
[HASH_ALGO_SHA256] = _(SHA256),
[HASH_ALGO_SHA384] = _(SHA384),
[HASH_ALGO_SHA512] = _(SHA512),
[HASH_ALGO_SHA224] = _(SHA224),
#undef _
......@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
......@@ -152,33 +154,33 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5;
ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1;
ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256;
ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384;
ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA384;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512;
ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA512;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224;
ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA224;
ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
......@@ -203,8 +205,8 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return -EINVAL;
ctx->cert->sig = value;
ctx->cert->sig_size = vlen;
ctx->cert->raw_sig = value;
ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen;
return 0;
......@@ -343,8 +345,9 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
if (ctx->last_oid != OID_rsaEncryption)
return -ENOPKG;
/* There seems to be an extraneous 0 byte on the front of the data */
ctx->cert->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
ctx->key = value + 1;
ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;
return 0;
......@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
struct x509_certificate {
......@@ -20,13 +21,11 @@ struct x509_certificate {
char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
struct tm valid_from;
struct tm valid_to;
enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8; /* Public key algorithm */
enum pkey_algo sig_pkey_algo : 8; /* Signature public key algorithm */
enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8; /* Signature hash algorithm */
const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
size_t tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
const void *sig; /* Signature data */
size_t sig_size; /* Size of sigature */
unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of sigature */
const void *raw_sig; /* Signature data */
struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
......@@ -34,3 +33,10 @@ struct x509_certificate {
extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert);
extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
* x509_public_key.c
extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
extern int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
struct x509_certificate *cert);
......@@ -18,85 +18,162 @@
#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
#include "public_key.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
static const
struct public_key_algorithm *x509_public_key_algorithms[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \
[PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = &RSA_public_key_algorithm,
* Find a key in the given keyring by issuer and authority.
static struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(
struct key *keyring,
const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
const char *authority, size_t auth_len)
key_ref_t key;
char *id;
/* Construct an identifier. */
id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!id)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
id[signer_len + 0] = ':';
id[signer_len + 1] = ' ';
memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len);
id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0;
pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
&key_type_asymmetric, id);
if (IS_ERR(key))
pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n",
id, PTR_ERR(key));
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
/* Hide some search errors */
case -EACCES:
case -ENOTDIR:
case -EAGAIN:
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
return ERR_CAST(key);
pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
* Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
* Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves
* digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
const struct x509_certificate *cert)
int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
struct public_key_signature *sig;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
size_t digest_size, desc_size;
void *digest;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
if (cert->sig.rsa.s)
return 0;