1. 11 Jun, 2019 1 commit
  2. 09 Jun, 2019 7 commits
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      NEWS: Note additional fixes in doc/ · 983e62be
      Simon McVittie authored
      Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie's avatarSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
      983e62be
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      doc: Install highlight.pack.js if present · a66357c1
      Simon McVittie authored
      Newer versions of yelp-build use this instead of a jQuery syntax
      highlighter.
      
      Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106171Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall's avatarPhilip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
      [smcv: Also add it to .gitignore as suggested]
      Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie's avatarSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
      (cherry picked from commit 49ad5b11)
      a66357c1
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      build: Uninstall JavaScript and CSS from htmldir · 7ea360f3
      Simon McVittie authored
      Otherwise, distcheck fails when mallard-ducktype is available.
      Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie's avatarSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
      (cherry picked from commit 9391d769)
      (cherry picked from commit 08e48ca6)
      7ea360f3
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      doc: Only install ancillary files from yelp-build if they exist · 9c5a924a
      Simon McVittie authored
      Newer versions of yelp-build don't install jquery.
      
      Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106171Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie's avatarSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
      Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall's avatarPhilip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
      (cherry picked from commit bab857fb)
      9c5a924a
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      Prepare version 1.10.28 · f3ab0e45
      Simon McVittie authored
      Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie's avatarSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
      f3ab0e45
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      test: Add basic test coverage for DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 · c251e7ea
      Simon McVittie authored
      We don't actually complete successful authentication, because that
      would require us to generate a cookie and compute the correct SHA1,
      which is difficult to do in a deterministic authentication script.
      However, we do assert that #269 (CVE-2019-12749) has been fixed.
      Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie's avatarSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
      c251e7ea
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      auth: Reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 for users other than the server owner · 525c2314
      Simon McVittie authored
      The DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication mechanism aims to prove ownership
      of a shared home directory by having the server write a secret "cookie"
      into a .dbus-keyrings subdirectory of the desired identity's home
      directory with 0700 permissions, and having the client prove that it can
      read the cookie. This never actually worked for non-malicious clients in
      the case where server uid != client uid (unless the server and client
      both have privileges, such as Linux CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or traditional
      Unix uid 0) because an unprivileged server would fail to write out the
      cookie, and an unprivileged client would be unable to read the resulting
      file owned by the server.
      
      Additionally, since dbus 1.7.10 we have checked that ~/.dbus-keyrings
      is owned by the uid of the server (a side-effect of a check added to
      harden our use of XDG_RUNTIME_DIR), further ruling out successful use
      by a non-malicious client with a uid differing from the server's.
      
      Joe Vennix of Apple Information Security discovered that the
      implementation of DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 was susceptible to a symbolic link
      attack: a malicious client with write access to its own home directory
      could manipulate a ~/.dbus-keyrings symlink to cause the DBusServer to
      read and write in unintended locations. In the worst case this could
      result in the DBusServer reusing a cookie that is known to the
      malicious client, and treating that cookie as evidence that a subsequent
      client connection came from an attacker-chosen uid, allowing
      authentication bypass.
      
      This is mitigated by the fact that by default, the well-known system
      dbus-daemon (since 2003) and the well-known session dbus-daemon (in
      stable releases since dbus 1.10.0 in 2015) only accept the EXTERNAL
      authentication mechanism, and as a result will reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1
      at an early stage, before manipulating cookies. As a result, this
      vulnerability only applies to:
      
      * system or session dbus-daemons with non-standard configuration
      * third-party dbus-daemon invocations such as at-spi2-core (although
        in practice at-spi2-core also only accepts EXTERNAL by default)
      * third-party uses of DBusServer such as the one in Upstart
      
      Avoiding symlink attacks in a portable way is difficult, because APIs
      like openat() and Linux /proc/self/fd are not universally available.
      However, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 already doesn't work in practice for
      a non-matching uid, we can solve this vulnerability in an easier way
      without regressions, by rejecting it early (before looking at
      ~/.dbus-keyrings) whenever the requested identity doesn't match the
      identity of the process hosting the DBusServer.
      Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie's avatarSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
      Closes: #269
      Closes: CVE-2019-12749
      525c2314
  3. 03 Dec, 2018 4 commits
  4. 05 Oct, 2018 1 commit
  5. 04 Oct, 2018 9 commits
  6. 30 Aug, 2018 2 commits
  7. 03 Aug, 2018 1 commit
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  9. 01 Mar, 2018 1 commit
  10. 23 Feb, 2018 1 commit
  11. 21 Feb, 2018 4 commits
  12. 28 Sep, 2017 1 commit
  13. 27 Sep, 2017 1 commit
  14. 25 Sep, 2017 2 commits