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  1. 15 Apr, 2015 1 commit
  3. 13 Apr, 2015 2 commits
  5. 09 Feb, 2015 1 commit
  7. 05 Feb, 2015 1 commit
  9. 04 Feb, 2015 3 commits
  11. 05 Jan, 2015 4 commits
  13. 01 Jan, 2015 5 commits
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      Prepare release for Monday · abbbf449
      Simon McVittie authored
      abbbf449
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      Hardening: only accept Stats function calls at the canonical object path · eec885de
      Simon McVittie authored 
      These function calls are not a privilege escalation risk like
UpdateActivationEnvironment, but they might provide sensitive
information or be enhanced to provide sensitive information
in future, so the default system.conf locks them down to root-only.
Apply the same canonical-object-path hardening as for
UpdateActivationEnvironment.

We do not apply the uid check here because they are less dangerous
than UpdateActivationEnvironment, and because the ability to unlock
these function calls for specific uids is a documented configuration
for developers.
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira's avatarThiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
[added missing #include; extended commit message -smcv]
      eec885de
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      Add a regression test for path-based UpdateActivationEnvironment hardening · 4daf4bdc
      Simon McVittie authored 
      Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira's avatarThiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
      4daf4bdc
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      Hardening: only allow the uid of the dbus-daemon to call UpdateActivationEnvironment · a67cb9bf
      Simon McVittie authored 
      As with the previous commit, this is probably not actually privilege
escalation due to the use of an activation helper that cleans up its
environment, but let's be extra-careful here.
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira's avatarThiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
[adjusted commit message -smcv]
      a67cb9bf
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      Hardening: reject UpdateActivationEnvironment on non-canonical path · 6a3f563a
      Simon McVittie authored 
      UpdateActivationEnvironment is the one dbus-daemon API call that is
obviously dangerous (it is intended for the session bus),
so the default system.conf does not allow anyone to call it.

It has recently come to the D-Bus maintainers' attention that some
system services incorrectly install D-Bus policy rules that allow
arbitrary method calls to any destination as long as they have a
"safe" object path. This is not actually safe: some system services
that use low-level D-Bus bindings like libdbus, including dbus-daemon
itself, provide the same API on all object paths.

Unauthorized calls to UpdateActivationEnvironment are probably just
resource consumption rather than privilege escalation, because on
the system bus, the modified environment is only used to execute
a setuid wrapper that avoids LD_PRELOAD etc. via normal setuid
handling, and sanitizes its own environment before executing
the real service. However, it's safest to assume the worst and
treat it as a potential privilege escalation.

Accordingly, as a hardening measure to avoid privilege escalation on
systems with these faulty services, stop allowing calls to
("/com/example/Whatever",
"org.freedesktop.DBus.UpdateActivationEnvironment")
and only allow ("/org/freedesktop/DBus",
"org.freedesktop.DBus.UpdateActivationEnvironment").

We deliberately continue to provide read-only APIs like
GetConnectionUnixUser at all object paths, for backwards compatibility.
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira's avatarThiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
[adjusted commit message to note that this is probably only DoS -smcv]
      6a3f563a
  15. 23 Dec, 2014 1 commit
  17. 24 Nov, 2014 2 commits
  19. 22 Nov, 2014 2 commits
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      Revert "config: change default auth_timeout to 5 seconds" · 02e1ddf9
      Simon McVittie authored 
      This reverts commit 54d26df5.

It appears this change may cause intermittent slow or failed boot,
more commonly on slower/older machines, in at least Mageia and
possibly also Debian. This would indicate that while the system
is under load, system services are not completing authentication
within 5 seconds.

This change was not the main part of fixing CVE-2014-3639, but does
help to mitigate that attack. As such, increasing this timeout makes
the denial of service attack described by CVE-2014-3639 somewhat
more effective: a local user connecting to the system bus repeatedly
from many parallel processes can cause other users' attempts to
connect to take longer.

If your machine boots reliably with the shorter timeout, and
resilience against local denial of service attacks is important
to you, putting this in /etc/dbus-1/system-local.conf
or a file matching /etc/dbus-1/system.d/*.conf can restore
the lower limit:

    <busconfig>
      <limit name="auth_timeout">5000</limit>
    </busconfig>

Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86431
      02e1ddf9
    • Simon McVittie's avatar
      Log to syslog when auth_timeout drops an incomplete connection · 29c64424
      Simon McVittie authored 
      This is a symptom of either a denial of service attack, or a
serious performance problem. Either way, sysadmins should know.

Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86431
      29c64424
  21. 14 Nov, 2014 3 commits
  23. 10 Nov, 2014 2 commits
  25. 06 Nov, 2014 2 commits
  27. 16 Sep, 2014 1 commit
  29. 15 Sep, 2014 10 commits