When a D-Bus message includes attached file descriptors, the body of the
message contains unsigned 32-bit indexes pointing into an out-of-band
array of file descriptors. Some D-Bus APIs like GLib's GDBus refer to
these indexes as "handles" for the associated fds (not to be confused
with a Windows HANDLE, which is a kernel object).

The assertion message removed by this commit is arguably correct up to
a point: fd-passing is only reasonable on a local machine, and no known
operating system allows processes of differing endianness even on a
multi-endian ARM or PowerPC CPU, so it makes little sense for the sender
to specify a byte-order that differs from the byte-order of the recipient.

However, this doesn't account for the fact that a malicious sender
doesn't have to restrict itself to only doing things that make sense.
On a system with untrusted local users, a message sender could crash
the system dbus-daemon (a denial of service) by sending a message in
the opposite endianness that contains handles to file descriptors.

Before this commit, if assertions are enabled, attempting to byteswap
a fd index would cleanly crash the message recipient with an assertion
failure. If assertions are disabled, attempting to byteswap a fd index
would silently do nothing without advancing the pointer p, causing the
message's type and the pointer into its contents to go out of sync, which
can result in a subsequent crash (the crash demonstrated by fuzzing was
a use-after-free, but other failure modes might be possible).

In principle we could resolve this by rejecting wrong-endianness messages
from a local sender, but it's actually simpler and less code to treat
wrong-endianness messages as valid and byteswap them.

Thanks: Evgeny Vereshchagin
Fixes: ba7daa60 "unix-fd: add basic marshalling code for unix fds"
Resolves: #417
Resolves: CVE-2022

-42012
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>