diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index f93c7befb5dcbdf677eb3117b9a55fefd8908a5d..af88d9b9c0143cbffefefaeeda70f91751b730d1 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -6572,6 +6572,19 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
 }
 
+static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+
+	/* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the
+	 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in
+	 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still
+	 * rewrite/sanitize them.
+	 */
+	if (!vstate->speculative)
+		env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
+}
+
 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
 			const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
@@ -10630,7 +10643,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		}
 
 		regs = cur_regs(env);
-		env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
+		sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
 		prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
 
 		if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
@@ -10857,7 +10870,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 					return err;
 
 				env->insn_idx++;
-				env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
+				sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
 			} else {
 				verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
@@ -12712,6 +12725,9 @@ static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
  * insn_aux_data was touched. These variables are compared to clear temporary
  * data from failed pass. For testing and experiments do_check_common() can be
  * run multiple times even when prior attempt to verify is unsuccessful.
+ *
+ * Note that special handling is needed on !env->bypass_spec_v1 if this is
+ * ever called outside of error path with subsequent program rejection.
  */
 static void sanitize_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 {